

The road to improvement: governance indicators and socio-economic outcomes

A PFMConnect Study Report by David Fellows & John Leonardo



1. Introduction

In this study we look across a series of governance and outcome evaluation systems to assess the evidence for consistency within and between the two.

The main intention is to understand the extent to which progress in one field mirrors progress in others and consider what this may suggest about the drivers of the relationships observed, identifying any areas requiring further research.

Our work is based on the World Bank Governance Indicators ([WBGI](#)s) and a set of key Socio-economic Outcome Indicators (SEOIs) derived from the World Health Organisation ([WHO](#)) & United Nations Development Programme ([UNDP](#)) data sets. Data for 2004 (2005 for Health) and 2021 was derived from the 176 countries for which all necessary data was available. This is intended to provide a reasonable timespan and data sample for

such an exercise. The one exception to this approach is in Table 5 (examining the relationship between female & male Expected Years of Schooling and GNIpc) where data from only 163 of the 176 counties is available.

Technical Note

Regression analysis is used throughout this study to determine the closeness of fit between the data being compared. For this we use Pearson coefficients (shown in the tables below) and r^2 values. Given that we are interrogating data based on social behaviour we take a 'satisfactory' r^2 value as being of between 0.4 and 0.5. This range is equivalent to Pearson coefficients of approximately 0.64 and 0.72. We therefore regard Pearson coefficients above 0.72 as 'good' and below 0.64 as 'unsatisfactory'. All the correlations in this study exhibit P values < 5%. The results are coloured in the tables below, as follows: ■■■■■; ■■■■■; ■■■■■; and ■■■■■.

2. World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI's)

The WBGI's have 6 aspects: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and absence of violence/terrorism; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption (abbreviated in the tables below). In Tables 1 & 2 we examine the internal consistency of these data sets for the two chosen points in time (2004 and 2021).

| Table 1: Correlations between WBGIs using 2004 data | | | | | | |
|---|-------|----------|----------|----------|--------|--------|
| | V&A | Pol Stab | Govt Eff | Reg Qual | R of L | C of C |
| V&A | 1.000 | .673 | .847 | .862 | .874 | .822 |
| Pol Stab | .673 | 1.000 | .683 | .684 | .792 | .753 |
| Govt Eff | .847 | .683 | 1.000 | .936 | .936 | .936 |
| Reg Qual | .862 | .684 | .936 | 1.000 | .920 | .891 |
| R of L | .874 | .792 | .936 | .920 | 1.000 | .945 |
| C of C | .822 | .753 | .936 | .891 | .945 | 1.000 |

| Table 2: Correlations between WBGIs using 2021 data | | | | | | |
|---|-------|----------|----------|----------|--------|--------|
| | V&A | Pol Stab | Govt Eff | Reg Qual | R of L | C of C |
| V&A | 1.000 | .724 | .686 | .739 | .785 | .772 |
| Pol Stab | .724 | 1.000 | .734 | .703 | .799 | .764 |
| Govt Eff | .686 | .734 | 1.000 | .937 | .935 | .903 |
| Reg Qual | .739 | .703 | .937 | 1.000 | .928 | .887 |
| R of L | .785 | .799 | .935 | .928 | 1.000 | .938 |
| C of C | .772 | .764 | .903 | .887 | .938 | 1.000 |

All elements of the WBGIs correlate well internally across the data sets for both periods. For 2004 data (Table1) Political Stability achieved the lowest performance with ‘satisfactory’ correlations across three variables (Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality). For 2021 (Table 2) Political Stability had just one ‘satisfactory’ result (Regulatory Quality) with another ‘satisfactory’ result being obtained between Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness. All other results for both periods were ‘good’.

3. WHO and UNDP Socio-Economic Outcome Indicators (SE0Is)

The five key SE0Is chosen for this exercise cover a wide spectrum of personal and community development activities:

Health; Human Development[1]; Life Expectancy; Expected Years of Schooling; and Gross National Income per capita. The Health indicator is compiled by the World Health Organisation and the others by the United Nations Development Programme. In Tables 3 & 4 we examine the internal consistency of these data sets for the two chosen points in time (2004 and 2021).

| Table 3: Correlations between key outcome indicators using 2004 data | | | | | |
|--|---------|-------|----------|-------------|-------|
| | Health* | HDI | Life Exp | Exp Yrs Sch | GNIpc |
| Health* | 1.000 | .938 | .873 | .880 | .670 |
| HDI | .938 | 1.000 | .907 | .918 | .739 |
| Life Exp | .873 | .907 | 1.000 | .776 | .637 |
| Est Yrs Sch | .880 | .918 | .776 | 1.000 | .587 |
| GNIpc | .670 | .739 | .637 | .587 | 1.000 |

*Health data for 2005, the nearest year available

| Table 4: Correlations between key outcome indicators using 2021 data | | | | | |
|--|--------|-------|----------|-------------|-------|
| | Health | HDI | Life Exp | Exp Yrs Sch | GNIpc |
| Health* | 1.000 | .926 | .862 | .835 | .737 |
| HDI | .926 | 1.000 | .906 | .900 | .828 |
| Life Exp | .862 | .906 | 1.000 | .789 | .764 |
| Est Yrs Sch | .835 | .900 | .789 | 1.000 | .694 |
| GNIpc | .737 | .828 | .764 | .694 | 1.000 |

Each of the SEOIs correlate well internally across the two data sets for both periods. For 2004/5 (Table 3) GNIpc was rated 'unsatisfactory' against Expected Years of Schooling and 'satisfactory' against Health and Life Expectancy although in 2021 (Table 4) this performance improved to 'satisfactory' for Expected Years of Schooling and 'good' for Health and Life Expectancy. All other results for both periods were 'good'.

4. Focus on female and male years of schooling

There is much work that we could do at both a broad and granular level with respect to both WBGI and SE0Is but for the moment we have chosen to examine the relationship between Expected Years of Schooling for females and males (EYS(f)/EYS(m)) and Gross National Income per capita for females and males (GNIpc(f)/GNIpc(m)) for 2004 and 2021 (Table 5). In doing this we use the same UNDP data source as for the material in section 3 above.

| Table 5: Correlations between Estimated Years of Schooling and GNI per capita | | | | |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 2004 | | 2021 | |
| | EYS(f) | EYS(m) | EYS(f) | EYS(m) |
| GNIpc(f) | .674 | ----- | .717 | ----- |
| GNIpc(m) | ----- | .600 | ----- | .701 |

Table 5 includes only 163 of the 176 countries used in the other tables as data for the remaining 13 countries is unavailable for these indicators

A recent [IMF Blog](#) stresses the importance of female participation in the labour market to improve the economic output of emerging and developing economies. Table 5 demonstrates that female schooling correlates well with female income generation. The lower correlation values for males could indicate that there are more diverse routes for males into economic activity making education a slightly more important route for the earning power of women although the male correlation improved from unsatisfactory to satisfactory between the two study periods, seemingly indicating an increased relevance of education to male earning capacity.

5. Examining the relationship between WBGIs and Outcomes

We next examined the relationships between WBGIs and SE0Is by correlating the WBGIs from section 2 and the SE0Is from section 3.

| WBGIs | Health* | HDI | Life Exp | Exp Yrs Sch | GNIpc |
|----------|---------|------|----------|-------------|-------|
| V&A | .669 | .681 | .600 | .653 | .523 |
| Pol Stab | .537 | .576 | .493 | .555 | .533 |
| Gov Eff | .782 | .811 | .718 | .739 | .753 |
| Reg Qual | .767 | .791 | .693 | .714 | .730 |
| R of L | .723 | .765 | .686 | .704 | .702 |
| C of C | .734 | .752 | .659 | .704 | .737 |

*Health data for 2005, the nearest year available

| WBGIs | Health | HDI | Life Exp | Exp Yrs Sch | GNIpc |
|----------|--------|------|----------|-------------|-------|
| V&A | .509 | .583 | .529 | .587 | .496 |
| Pol Stab | .546 | .631 | .568 | .569 | .561 |
| Gov Eff | .738 | .828 | .771 | .730 | .825 |
| Reg Qual | .716 | .811 | .733 | .735 | .826 |
| R of L | .653 | .770 | .717 | .695 | .789 |
| C of C | .632 | .725 | .677 | .670 | .771 |

The analysis in Tables 6 & 7 demonstrates that four of the WBGIs (Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption – termed here the ‘key’ WBGIs) correlate well with all the SE0Is included in this study for both the 2004/5 and 2021 data sets. For 2004/5 fourteen of these ‘key WBI’ correlations are ‘good’ and six are

'satisfactory'. For 2021 fifteen of these correlations are 'good' and five are 'satisfactory'. Government Effectiveness is 'good' across all five SE0Is for both years. Political Stability appears at first sight to be the most consistently problematic across the two sets of correlations although all its correlations for the 2021 data set show improved Pearson coefficients for 2021 and one is borderline unsatisfactory. Voice and Accountability declines from three satisfactory and two unsatisfactory results for 2004/5 to five unsatisfactory results in 2021

6. The World Justice Programme – an approach to analysing performance standards

[The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index](#) provides an accessible level of analysis of key governance characteristics (eg: absence of judicial corruption; accessibility and affordability of civil redress; effective criminal investigations) that assists consideration of their potential contribution to service improvement. The Rule of Law Index is not unique but it is impressive exemplar for the presentation of governance data.

The addition of organisational efficiency indicators within this framework could prove useful.

7. Discussion

Evidence from the internal analysis of World Bank Governance Indicators (Tables 1 & 2) and SEOIs (Tables 3 & 4) suggests that when one indicator from either of these data sets is executed well then the whole data set tends to be executed well and vice versa. The exception to this is the relationship between Expected Years of Schooling and GNI per capita in the 2004 data set (Table 3), although the 2021 result proves 'satisfactory' (Table 4).

'Key WBGIs' are mostly concerned with administrative and policy development tasks usually requiring broadly similar skill sets. Experiences in this field can be shared through regular contact in business meetings and client department project work.

Socio-economic activities are highly diverse in comparison to the tasks represented by the WBGIs. These activities are often highly customer-facing and require input from staff having many different backgrounds who do not often collaborate or even meet one another across service boundaries. The possibility of common levels of good or poor performance between socio-economic activities seems remote unless good standards of service performance are compared and developed across Government. The prevalence of satisfactory and good correlations amongst this data set seems particularly worthy of further consideration

The results of cross correlations between the 'key WBGIs' and the 'SEOIs' suggest that the 'key WBGIs' represent those activities that seem the most likely contributors to good socio-economic performance. In comparison, the WBGI 'outliers' (Voice & Accountability and Political Stability), although clearly preferable characteristics in their own right when realised to a high standard, do not seem to offer a consistent

influence on good socio-economic public service delivery.

It could be argued that rather than the WBGIs driving the SEOIs, these data sets are driven by common factors such as national wealth, strength of democracy, uniformity of income distribution within the population or the quality of leadership at administrative or political level. So far we have established no such links and direct national leadership impact on a multitude of service delivery points seems improbable.

We note that the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index offers an analytical format that could be applied to both governance and service performance. It could help equip individuals, community groups and governments to improve service outcomes at various levels.

Finally, female secondary education has many advantages but the particular advantage this study seems to suggest is that the education of females improves the wealth they generate. This result offers clear support for the economic arguments in favour of female education.

8. Conclusions

The outcomes from this study suggest that:

- WBGIs and SEOIs each have strong internal consistency of performance. From this it could be inferred that well

organised administrations are likely to be well organised at a general level rather than as a series of independent activities. The issue is more remarkable in terms of SEOIs given that WBGIs could be regarded as mainly dependent on similar skill sets whereas this seems less likely in the case of SEOIs.

- The degree of compatibility between the four 'key' WBGIs and the SEOIs used in this study suggest that the 'key' governance indicators tend to influence the quality of service outcomes. Good governance, therefore, would seem to improve the quality of services, poor governance having an opposite effect.

- Our findings suggest that national leaders should consider the improvement of governance as a contribution to the improvement of service outcomes. The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index provides an analytical format that could help in this process.

- The correspondence between female Expected Years of Schooling and female GNIpc provides powerful support for female education on economic grounds alone, confirming opinions already expressed by others.

PFMConnect is a public financial management consultancy with a particular interest in the use of digital communication to support learning and sharing expertise amongst the international development community.


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[\[1\]](#) The Human Development (HDI) subset used in this study is a composite index developed by the UNDP that consists of: Life Expectancy, Expected Years of Schooling, GNIpc (all show separately here) plus Estimated Mean Years of Schooling.

Corruption in Eastern Europe

(a US perspective)



Introduction

The United States State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* ("country reports") strive to provide a factual and objective record on the status of human rights worldwide. The 2021 country reports were published on 12 April 2022. Section 4 of the country reports provides an assessment of Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government which addresses the extent to which a country's law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials and the level of implementation of these laws. This blog examines current enforcement action to address corruption in Eastern Europe by officials.

Scores for Eastern European countries published by Transparency International in their 2021 Corruption

Perceptions Index (CPI) report demonstrate that Eastern Europe was ranked second out of global regions in terms of improvements in CPI scores during 2012-2021. Improvements in CPI scores in excess of the global average were recorded by the majority of Eastern European countries during the 2012-2021 period. The country reports for Eastern European countries reveal that only one Eastern European country was making progress in effectively implementing current criminal penalties for corruption by officials (and only on a partial basis). Further discussion on corruption trends in Eastern European countries is provided [here](#).

Details of the overview comments for Eastern European countries in the 2021 country reports are provided below.

Albania

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by public officials and prohibits individuals with criminal convictions from serving as mayors, parliamentarians, or in government or state positions, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Corruption was pervasive in all branches of government, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Through September, the Special Prosecution Office against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) announced that it had opened investigations and brought charges against several public officials, including former ministers, mayors, sitting judges and prosecutors, former and sitting judges of the Constitutional Court’s Vetting Appeal’s Chamber, former judges of the Supreme Court, and officials in the executive branch. As of September, one judge, two prosecutors, one mayor, and the former procurement director at the Ministry of Interior were indicted on abuse of office or corruption charges.

The constitution requires judges and prosecutors to undergo vetting for unexplained wealth, ties to organized crime, and professional competence. The Independent Qualification Commission conducted vetting, and the Appeals Chamber reviewed contested decisions. The International Monitoring Operation, composed of international judicial experts, oversaw the process. As of November, 125 judges and prosecutors were dismissed, 103 confirmed, while 48 others had resigned rather than undergo vetting. As of July, 173 judges and prosecutors were dismissed, 148 confirmed, while 89 others had resigned or retired.

Several government agencies investigated corruption cases, but limited resources, investigative leaks, real and perceived political pressure, and a haphazard reassignment system hampered investigations.”

Armenia

“The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. Following the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” the government opened investigations that revealed systemic corruption encompassing most areas of public and private life. The government launched numerous criminal cases against alleged corruption by former high-ranking government officials and their relatives, parliamentarians, the former presidents, and in a few instances, members of the judiciary and their relatives, with cases ranging from a few thousand to millions of dollars. Many of the cases continued, and additional cases were reported regularly. The government also initiated corruption-related cases against several current government officials and members of the judiciary.

In addition to integrity checks of nominees, the Corruption Prevention Commission exercised its powers to review sitting judges' asset declarations and to communicate to law enforcement information that may indicate a crime. As a result, three disciplinary, three administrative, and one criminal case had been initiated.

Authorities took measures to strengthen the institutional framework to fight corruption, including establishing the Anticorruption Committee, which served as the primary law enforcement body dealing with corruption. The committee began operations in October and initiated several cases, such as charging former chief of police Vladimir Gasparyan with legalizing criminally obtained property worth more than two billion drams (\$4.1 million) and other criminal acts.”

Azerbaijan

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. While the government made some progress in combating low-level corruption in the provision of government services, there were continued reports of corruption by government officials, including those at the highest levels.

Transparency International and other observers described corruption as widespread. There were reports of corruption in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. For example, in six reports on visits made to the country between 2004 and 2017, the CPT noted that corruption in the country's entire law enforcement system remained “systemic and endemic.” In a report on its most recent visit

to the country in 2017, for example, the CPT cited the practice of law enforcement officials demanding payments in exchange for dropping or reducing charges or for releasing individuals from unrecorded custody. These problems persisted throughout the year. Media reported that on April 26, the head of the Shamkir Executive Committee Alimpasha Mammadov was detained on corruption-related charges.

Similar to previous years, authorities continued to punish individuals for exposing government corruption. For example, during the year police detained two civil society activists who were then turned over to the Main Department to Combat Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The two activists were preparing a media story about government corruption. Main Department to Combat Organized Crime officials reportedly tortured one of these individuals.”

Belarus

“The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government appeared to prosecute regularly officials alleged to be corrupt. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators reflected that corruption was a serious problem in the country. In 2019 the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) declared the country noncompliant with its anticorruption standards. The government did not publish evaluation or compliance reports, which according to GRECO’s executive secretary, “casted a dark shadow over the country’s commitment to preventing and combating corruption and to overall cooperation with GRECO.” In 2019 GRECO’s executive secretary repeated its concerns regarding the country’s “continuous noncompliance.””

Bosnia and Herzegovina

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively nor prioritize public corruption as a serious problem. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year. Courts have not processed high-level corruption cases, and in most of the finalized cases, suspended sentences were pronounced. Officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and corruption remained prevalent in many political and economic institutions. Corruption was especially prevalent in the health and education sectors, public procurement processes, local governance, and public administration employment procedures.

The government has mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption, but political pressure often prevented the application of these mechanisms. Observers considered police impunity widespread, and there were continued reports of corruption within the state and entity security services. There are internal affairs investigative units within all police agencies. Throughout the year, mostly with assistance from the international community, the government provided training to police and security forces designed to combat abuse and corruption and promote respect for human rights. The field training manuals for police officers also include ethics and anticorruption training components.”

Georgia

“The law provides criminal penalties for officials convicted of corruption. While the government implemented the law

effectively against low-level corruption, NGOs continued to cite weak checks and balances and a lack of independence of law enforcement agencies among the factors contributing to allegations of high-level corruption. NGOs assessed there were no effective mechanisms for preventing corruption in state-owned enterprises and independent regulatory bodies. NGOs continued to call for an independent anticorruption agency outside the authority of the State Security Service, alleging its officials were abusing its functions.

On September 8, Transparency International/Georgia stated the country had “impressively low levels of petty corruption combined with near total impunity for high-level corruption.” The country also lacked an independent anticorruption agency to combat high-level corruption.

Several months after resigning, in a May 31 interview former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia noted that the country’s “biggest challenge is weak institutions. When institutions are weak, corruption and nepotism represent a problem.”

The Anticorruption Coordination Council included government officials, legal professionals, business representatives, civil society, and international organizations. In March amendments to the Law on Conflict of Interest in Public Service moved responsibility for assisting the work of the Anticorruption Council from the Justice Ministry to the Administration of the Government, headed by the prime minister but separate from the Prime Minister’s Office. Formation of the relevant secretariat was underway at year’s end. The last Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan was developed by the council in 2019. The council has not met since it was moved under the government’s administration.

Transparency International/Georgia, in its October 2020 report *Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Georgia: 2016-2020*, noted the government annually approves national action plans to combat corruption. It reported some shortcomings, however, including ineffective investigations of cases of alleged high-level corruption. Although the law restricts gifts to public officials to a maximum of 5 percent of their annual salary, a loophole allowing unlimited gifts to public officials from their family members continued to be a source of concern for anticorruption watchdogs. In January, Transparency International/Georgia noted that the country's anticorruption reforms did not progress.

As of March, Transparency International/Georgia listed 50 uninvestigated high-profile cases of corruption involving high-ranking public officials or persons associated with the ruling party.”

Kosovo

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were reports of government corruption. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. A lack of effective judicial oversight and general weakness in the rule of law contributed to the problem. Corruption cases were routinely subject to repeated appeal, and the judicial system often allowed statutes of limitation to expire without trying cases.”

Moldova

“While the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, the government failed to implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Despite some improvement, corruption remained a serious problem. Corruption in the judiciary and other state structures was widespread. Addressing corruption was one of the main promises of the new government formed after the July 11 snap parliamentary elections. One of the new government’s first steps was to amend the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office to allow the dismissal of the prosecutor general for “unsatisfactory performance” or his suspension in the event of a criminal case against him. Opposition parties contested the law, which was upheld by the Constitutional Court on September 30.

The law authorizes the National Anticorruption Center to verify wealth and address “political integrity, public integrity, institutional integrity, and favoritism.” The National Integrity Authority (NIA), which was formed to check assets, personal interests, and conflicts of interest of officials, was not fully operational due to prolonged delays in selecting integrity inspectors, as required by law. The PAS harshly criticized both the National Anticorruption Center (NAC) and the NIA for lack of action in investigating corrupt officials. Civil society organizations maintained that the NIA and NAC were still ineffective in fighting corruption. In November PAS members of parliament passed a bill that allows parliament to directly appoint or fire the director of the NAC. On November 19, parliament heard the legal committee’s report regarding NAC activity and fired the center’s director. Another bill voted by PAS on October 7 more clearly defines the role of NIA and enhances its operational capacity. On September 21, the Constitutional Court struck down the December 2020 law that limited NIA powers.”

Montenegro

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and corruption remained a problem. Corruption and low public trust in government institutions were major issues in the 2020 parliamentary elections. There were numerous media and NGO reports that the new government upheld old patterns and that the public viewed corruption in hiring practices based on personal relationships or political affiliation as endemic in the government and elsewhere in the public sector at both local and national levels, particularly in the areas of health care, higher education, the judiciary, customs, political parties, police, the armed forces, urban planning, the construction industry, and employment.

The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC) was strengthened through continued capacity-building activities and technical assistance during the year, but domestic NGOs were critical of the agency’s lack of transparency and described periodic working group meetings with it as cosmetic and superficial. The European Commission noted that problems related to APC’s independence, priorities, selective approach, and decision quality continued.

Agencies tasked with fighting corruption acknowledged that cooperation and information sharing among them was inadequate; their capacity improved but remained limited. Politicization, poor salaries, and lack of motivation and training of public servants provided fertile ground for corruption.”

North Macedonia

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials. The government generally implemented the law, but there were reports officials engaged in corruption. NGOs stated the government’s dominant role in the economy created opportunities for corruption. The government was the country’s largest employer. According to the Minister of Information, Society, and Administration, as of the end of December 2020, there were 131,183 persons employed in the public sector. Previously, some individuals on the government’s payroll did not fill real positions in the bureaucracy. On January 19, the government adopted a plan for assigning 1,349 civil servants paid by the Ministry of Political Systems and Community Relations – who at that time did not encumber a real position – to specific jobs across 237 government institutions. On April 27, the government dismissed the State Market Inspectorate director, Stojko Paunovski, for refusing to enforce the government decision assigning 35 civil servants to his institution.

On April 18, parliament adopted the 2021-2025 National Strategy for Countering Corruption and Conflict of Interest, along with the implementing action plan. On July 14, the government adopted a 2021-2023 National Strategy for Strengthening Capacities for Financial Investigations and Confiscation of Property as part of its plan for fighting corruption and provided for a commission to monitor the strategy’s implementation.”

Russia

“The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government acknowledged difficulty in enforcing the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of

government corruption during the year.”

Serbia

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively, and convictions for high-level official corruption were rare. According to an April public opinion survey by the CRTA, 65 percent of citizens believed there was significant corruption in the country, the majority believed the state was ineffective in fighting corruption, and 62 percent believed the government put pressure on individuals, media, or organizations that identified cases of corruption in which members of the government were reportedly involved. There was a widespread public perception that the law was not being implemented consistently and systematically and that some high-level officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year. The government reported an increase in prosecution of low- to mid-level corruption cases, money laundering, and economic crimes cases. High-profile convictions of senior government figures for corruption, however, were rare, and corruption was prevalent in many areas and remained a problem of concern.

The Freedom House *Nations in Transit 2021* report described the country as a “hybrid regime” rather than a democracy due to reported corruption among senior officials that had gone unaddressed in recent years. While the legal framework for fighting corruption was broadly in place, anticorruption entities typically lacked adequate personnel and authority and were not integrated with other judicial, legal, or other entities, which inhibited information and evidence sharing with the prosecution service. Freedom House’s 2020 report on

the country noted the work of the Anticorruption Agency (ACA) was undermined in part by the ambiguous division of responsibilities among other entities tasked with combating corruption. Freedom House downgraded the country's political pluralism and participation score in part based on the credible reports that the ACA did not thoroughly investigate dubious political campaign contributions, including the use of thousands of proxy donors to bypass legal limits on individual campaign donations and disguise the true source of funding. The *GRECO 2020 Annual Report* found that the country had not fully implemented anticorruption measures related to the recruitment and rules of conduct governing members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors.

EU experts noted continuing problems with the overuse of the vague "abuse of office" charge for alleged private-sector corruption cases. Despite the government's publicly stated commitment to fight corruption, both the country's Anticorruption Council and the NGO Transparency Serbia continued to point to a lack of governmental transparency."

Turkey

"While the law provides criminal penalties for conviction of official corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively, and some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Parliament entrusts the Court of Accounts, the country's supreme audit institution, with accountability related to revenues and expenditures of government departments. Outside this audit system, there was no dedicated regulator with the exclusive responsibility for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases and there were concerns regarding the impartiality of the judiciary in the handling of corruption cases. According to Transparency International, the

public procurement system has consistently declined in transparency and competitiveness, with exceptions to the Public Procurement Law widely applied.

While opposition politicians frequently accused the ruling party of corruption, there were only isolated journalistic or official investigations of government corruption during the year. Journalists and civil society organizations reported fearing retribution for reporting on corruption issues. Authorities continued to pursue criminal and civil charges against journalists reporting on corruption allegations. Courts and RTUK regularly blocked access to press reports regarding corruption.

In May the state-run Anadolu Agency fired reporter Musab Turan after he asked government officials about corruption allegations against Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu during a press conference. Anadolu Agency issued a statement that Turan was fired for lacking “journalistic principles” and propagating “political propaganda.” The statement also said that Anadolu requested that prosecutors open a terrorism investigation into Turan. Fahrettin Altun, the presidency’s communications director, wrote on Twitter, “Those who seek to harm the respectability of our state will pay the price.””

Ukraine

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption. Authorities did not effectively implement the law, and many officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. While the number of reports of government corruption was low, observers noted corruption remained pervasive at all levels in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of

government. From January 1 to June 30, the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine launched 336 investigations that resulted in 25 indictments against 43 individuals. Accused individuals included public officials, heads of state-owned enterprises, one judge, and others.

On September 5, the High Anticorruption Court (HACC) announced that in the previous two years it had convicted 10 judges for a range of offenses, including soliciting bribes, lying in financial declarations, and abuse of office. The court sentenced the judges to between two and nine years in prison, deprived them of the right to hold office for a period of three years, and confiscated property. In 2020 and during the year, the HACC sentenced 36 officials to imprisonment on corruption-related charges. Anticorruption bodies continued to face pressure from antireform elites and oligarchs in the form of misinformation campaigns and political maneuvering that undermined public trust and threatened the viability of the institutions. Human rights groups called for increased transparency and discussion regarding proposed changes to these bodies, particularly respecting procedures for appointments to leadership positions. As of September 13, it was widely held that the selection process for the new head of the Special Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office remained stalled due to political interference.

Human rights groups claimed another threat to the anticorruption infrastructure came from the Constitutional Court, where antireform interests exercised undue influence on judges. Parliament amended some provisions of anticorruption legislation that had been overturned by Constitutional Court decisions in 2020, and legislation to safeguard the independence of the National Anticorruption Bureau was adopted by parliament on October 19. Also pending was a review by the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the High

Anticorruption Court law.


On July 13, parliament adopted legislation to relaunch the High Qualification Commission of Judges and High Council of Justice (HCJ), bodies that control the hiring of judges and judicial self-governance, respectively, and that judicial reform groups characterized as influenced by corrupt interests. Implementation of the law governing vetting of HCJ members, however, faltered within weeks of enactment, when the Council of Judges refused to nominate at least one candidate to serve on the HCJ Ethics Council, which is envisioned to comprise three legal experts nominated by international partners and three Ukrainian judges nominated by the Council of Judges. On October 23, the Council of Judges nominated four judge candidates, but legal experts noted the Supreme Court had referred the judicial reform law to the Constitutional Court to assess its constitutionality.”

Conclusion

The country reports for Eastern European countries demonstrate an unsatisfactory outcome with no countries in the region well placed to fight against corruption by officials.

Significant challenges in combatting corruption in Eastern Europe are likely to remain until there are material improvements in all countries in their ability to enforce criminal penalties for corruption.

Corruption in Southern Africa (a US perspective)



Introduction

The United States State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* ("country reports") strive to provide a factual and objective record on the status of human rights worldwide. The 2021 country reports were published on 12 April 2022.

Section 4 of the country reports provides an assessment of Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government which addresses the extent to which a country's law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials and the level of implementation of these laws.

Scores for Southern African countries published by Transparency International in their 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report demonstrate that Southern Africa was ranked second out of the five African regions in terms of improvements in CPI scores during 2012-2021. Individual country CPI score performance was mixed for Southern African countries in the 2012-2021 period. The country reports for Southern African countries reveal that only two Southern African countries were effectively implementing current criminal penalties for corruption by officials. Further discussion on corruption trends in Southern African countries is provided [here](#).

Details of the overview comments for Southern African countries in the 2021 country reports are provided below.

[Angola](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government implemented the law effectively. The government dismissed and prosecuted cabinet ministers, provincial governors, senior military officers, and other officials for corruption and financial crimes. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year. The Attorney General’s Office continued corruption investigations and brought criminal charges against several officials. Nonetheless, official impunity and the uniform application of anticorruption legislation remained a serious problem.”

[Botswana](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by

officials, and the government generally sought to implement these laws effectively. Officials tasked with enforcement lacked adequate training and resources, however. Media reports of government corruption continued. During the year there were numerous reports of government corruption, including allegations tied to tenders issued by local governments for COVID-19 projects, such as renovating public facilities so that they complied with virus prevention measures, as well as in the acquisition of personal protective equipment. A 2019 poll by Transparency International found that 7 percent of those polled had paid bribes to government officials, an increase from the 1 percent who reported paying bribes in a 2015 poll.”

[Eswatini](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were isolated reports of government corruption during the year. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”

[Lesotho](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials. The government did not implement the law effectively, and some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”

[Malawi](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.

The government, in cooperation with donors, continued implementation of an action plan to pursue cases of corruption, reviewed how the “Cashgate” corruption scandal occurred, and introduced internal controls and improved systems to prevent further occurrences. Progress on investigations and promised reforms was slow.”

Mozambique

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corrupt acts by officials; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of corruption in all branches and at all levels of government during the year.”

Namibia

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”

South Africa

“The law provides for criminal penalties for conviction of official corruption, and the government generally did not implement the law effectively, and officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.”

Zambia

“The law provides criminal penalties for officials convicted of corruption, and the government attempted to enforce the law but did so inconsistently. Officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Although the government collaborated with the international community and civil society organizations to improve capacity to investigate and prevent corruption, anticorruption NGOs observed that, the enforcement rate was low among senior government officials and in the civil service.

According to Transparency International Zambia, the conviction rate for those prosecuted for corruption was 10 to 20 percent. The Patriotic Front government did not effectively or consistently apply laws against corrupt officials; it selectively applied anticorruption law to target opposition leaders or officials who ran afoul of it. Transparency International Zambia further reported that, during the Patriotic Front administration, officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”

Zimbabwe

“The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption; however, the government did not implement the law


effectively or impartially. Despite government pronouncements, there were numerous reports of government corruption during the year. Experts described the problem as “catch and release,” where the government arrested some corrupt officials, often those out of favour, without ever convicting them.”

Conclusion

The country reports for Southern African countries demonstrate that only a minority of these countries are currently well placed to fight against corruption by officials. It is interesting to note that Angola and Eswatini which recorded relatively low scores in the 2021 Corruptions Perceptions Index were assessed in the country reports as enforcing criminal penalties for corruption relatively effectively.

Significant challenges in combatting corruption in Southern Africa are likely to remain until such time as the majority of countries make significant improvement in their ability to enforce criminal penalties for corruption.

Corruption in North Africa (a US perspective)



Introduction

The United States State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* ("country reports") strive to provide a factual and objective record on the status of human rights worldwide. The 2021 country reports were published on 12 April 2022.

Section 4 of the country reports provides an assessment of Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government which addresses the extent to which a country's law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials and the level of implementation of these laws.

Scores for North African countries published by Transparency International in their 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report demonstrate that North Africa was ranked first out of the five African regions in terms of improvements in country CPI scores during 2012-2021. Individual country CPI score performance was mixed for North African countries in the 2012-2021 period. The country reports for North African

countries reveal that no North African country was effectively implementing current criminal penalties for corruption by officials. Further discussion on corruption trends in North African countries is provided [here](#).

Details of the overview comments for North African countries in the 2021 country reports are provided below.

[Algeria](#)

“Authorities continued their anticorruption campaign against political, military, and security officials, as well as prominent business leaders from the Bouteflika era.

The law provides for criminal penalties of two to 10 years in prison for official corruption, but the government did not fully implement the law. Although President Tebboune’s administration has emphasized rooting out corruption, corruption remained a problem. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”

[Egypt](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not consistently implement the law effectively. There were reports of government corruption during the year, sometimes with impunity.”

[Libya](#)

“The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption but, as in 2020, no significant investigations or prosecutions occurred. There were many reports and accusations of government corruption due to the lack of transparency in the GNU’s management of security forces, oil revenues, and the national economy. There were allegations that government officials sometimes misused the letter of credit system to gain access to government funds.”

Mauritania

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by government officials, but authorities did not enforce the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.”

Morocco

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were reports of government corruption in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches during the year.”

Tunisia

“The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by

officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.”

Conclusion

The country reports for North African countries demonstrate that no North African country is well placed to fight against corruption by officials due to material weaknesses in prosecution capacity.

Progress in combatting public sector corruption in North Africa is likely to be constrained until there is a considerable improvement in the relevant authorities' ability to effectively enforce criminal penalties for corruption.